ABSTRACT

The previous chapter explored the implications of state sovereignty for understanding the causes of separatism, advancing the claim that the exercise and justification of sovereignty dis-/incentivize forms of action and therefore cannot be divorced from the question of why groups pursue a separatist agenda. Consequently, in order to adequately explain separatism, it is necessary to first investigate the function, exercise and justification of state sovereignty, since if states did not exercise sovereignty, then separatism, in the form that we understand it, would not occur. The significance of this observation becomes clear when we recognize that separatism does not constitute a rejection of sovereignty, but is instead an attempt to exercise it by redrawing the state’s geographical boundaries to exclude the group and its members – a tacit acknowledgment of sovereignty’s binary and exclusive character. Here, the analogy with divorce begins to break down, as one can, indeed, get divorced without remarrying or acknowledging the necessity or utility of marriage. In contrast, a group cannot claim a right to secede and form a state of its own (or join another state) without a fortiori endorsing the institution of statehood. This chapter continues this analysis by examining how the institution of sovereignty influences not only the decision to secede, but also the tactics employed in pursuit of this aim. Particular attention is also paid to the interactional and iterative character of separatist tactics vis-à-vis the response of the parent state and how each impacts the other. Returning to the twin attributes of embodiment and necessity introduced previously, the chapter explores the fine line walked by separatists between demonstrating the state’s ineffectiveness and redundancy, on the one hand, and alienating their target population, on the other. The indiscriminate use of military force, destruction of essential infrastructure and resulting damage to the local economy enable separatist groups to demonstrate government impotence, thereby questioning the state’s claims to necessity, while also creating a void that separatists can fill to validate their claim as the true representatives of the local population. However, this strategy, if not judiciously pursued (and it rarely is), runs the risk of delegitimizing separatist claims through forms of action that, while beneficial to attaining a position of military

superiority, may be contrary to the long-term interests of the populace. Similarly, states frequently also employ tactics of ‘controlled disorder’ to demonstrate their superior military and economic resources, but in so doing often contradict the legal-rational basis of their legitimacy, unwittingly boosting separatist mobilization. Of particular note in the context of South Asia have been the resort to draconian security legislation, the outsourcing of security functions to vigilantes, and the indiscriminate use of military force, which have undermined the legitimacy of the state by empowering local, extra-state sovereignty networks. As in the examination of the reasons why separatism develops in some groups but not others, it is important to bear in mind the complex inter-linkages between different factors that influence how a conflict plays out. Political, economic, social, cultural and other features influence perceptions of reality and the manner in which actors interpret and respond to events and dis-/incentives. For example, Barbora (2006) notes how the geographical and existential isolation of separatist-affected regions informs a quasi-colonial discourse whereby separatism is often attributed by the parent state to a lack of development and security that can only be remedied through the region’s successful reintegration within the national framework. Consequently, those who question the prevailing political order (including, but not limited to, separatists) are frequently portrayed as victims of Machiavellian plots hatched by foreign powers, ethnic entrepreneurs and anachronistic malfeasants hankering for impossible control over imagined or historically defunct political communities. In this manner, even reasonable demands for reform may be delegitimized, as the state dismisses separatism as the handiwork of deviants seeking to destabilize society. In contrast, separatists typically view attempts by the state to reassert its authority as an escalation of conflict that validates their own claims of government malfeasance. The result is a series of counter-claims and tit-for-tat violence described by Barbora (2006) as the ‘politics of controlled disorder,’ in which armed intervention, instability, the threat of violence, attrition and de-/escalation are the norm. New centers of control and authority emerge from the state security apparatus – individual rights are overridden and civilian institutions rendered toothless and irrelevant – as powerful military and political interests usurp authority. India provides perhaps the most compelling example of this process: separatist-affected regions frequently have their legislative assemblies dissolved, central rule is imposed, and former military or intelligence figures are appointed as governors. The discourse of development that links public funding, governance and loyalty to the state subverts the democratic concept of equal citizenship by portraying residents of separatist regions as marginal, un(der)-developed and on the periphery of civil society both politically and economically. It also entrenches elites, exacerbates corrupt networks of privilege and power through the disbursement of central funds and contracts (many of which are squandered or appropriated by economically dominant actors such as cronies of the ruling elite, the landed aristocracy and other propertied classes) and aggravates the sense of grievance motivating separatist sentiment. Furthermore, the poverty, lack of investment, retarded development and limited economic opportunities that

characterize many separatist regions, and which are worsened by separatist violence, serve the economic and political establishment by adding to the enormous pool of cheap labor in South Asian states (Das 2007). Military suppliers, construction contractors and others benefit economically from conflict and have an interest in its continuation. Disorder, lack of effective enforcement of workers’ rights, displacement of significant portions of the population (who effectively become domestic economic refugees) and the other consequences of conflict disempower individuals, leaving them (more) vulnerable to mistreatment and exploitation. On a macro level, centralization and the militarization of significant sectors of the economy and public life, combined with an increased developmental role for the state – e.g., in (re)building infrastructure for agricultural and industrial development – also creates dependencies on central funding and administration. This works to the parent state’s advantage by tying the region’s economic welfare to central government largesse, incentivizing maintenance of the political status quo and rewarding government supporters in separatistaffected regions with positions of influence in centrally funded projects and agencies. The aim of this chapter is to explore these, and other, linkages between violence and the factors that influence the trajectory of separatist conflict. The following section explores how both states and separatists can benefit from sowing disorder and the perception of powerlessness that it generates. This is followed by a discussion of the use of legislative power by states to address the causes and consequences of separatist violence, including draconian security legislation and the outsourcing of state functions to non-state actors. External assistance and intervention from other states are also examined as being important to understanding both the tactics and the longevity of many of South Asia’s separatist conflicts. Finally, internal disputes and violent conflict within separatist movements and between political actors are examined before some concluding remarks.