ABSTRACT
Climate change caused by greenhouse gas emissions is affecting societies and ecosystems across the globe. For decades scientists have expressed grave concerns about the implications of global warming. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates that a rise in average temperature of 2°C above the pre-industrial value (approximately 280 ppm) will significantly affect sea levels, food supply, health and extreme weather events (IPCC 2014). Although the issue is now mainstreamed within policy debates, it has remained contested for many years. Despite increasing evidence and urgency, advocates have struggled to get policymakers, citizens and even some scientists to take this threat seriously (Giddens 2011). A small number of scientists believe that climate change is not the result of human activity but rather of natural shifts in the environment (Curry and Webster 2011; Dyck et al. 2007). Other researchers believe that social issues such as health, education and poverty are more urgent (Goklany 2005, 2009). There was also an initial lack of urgency among policymakers and the wider public over pursuing climate change responses; Giddens (2011) has described this as a paradox, with a lack of tangible evidence inhibiting further action. As demonstrated by decades of climate change debate, knowledge and evidence are repeatedly used to steer or amplify agendas according to the interests of those involved. Policymakers around the world are now increasingly concerned about the
scale and urgency of climate change, and there is broad agreement within scientific communities regarding its likely impact. As a result many countries are developing plans to deal with this global threat. The growing consensus about the existence of the problem does not imply that climate change has become any less political, however. Climate change debates and actions remain highly complex, with many actors, agencies and institutions steering in different directions. Current political challenges relating to climate change centre around the north-south divide in negotiations, with ‘Annex 1’ countries (industrialised Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries according to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC)) demanding that emerging economies such as India and the People’s Republic of China which have larger shares in global emissions take a similar level of responsibility for climate action. Meanwhile, developing countries maintain that those countries historically responsible for causing the damage should finance their mitigation and adaptation efforts. Recognising the changing nature of the debate, this book shows how understanding the political economy of climate change is crucial to addressing the issue successfully. Much of the existing research, including that dealing with developing
countries, focuses only on apolitical and technocratic aspects of addressing climate change. With some notable exceptions (discussed later in this chapter), studies have targeted scientific, often linear solutions, and have paid limited attention to the political nature of the national governance systems needed to implement these solutions. A political economy approach to understanding climate change responses can provide much deeper insights into the efficiency, equity and effectiveness of the processes involved, and has particular relevance for low-income and developing countries. It is clear that climate change will affect some countries more than others: the least developed countries (LDCs), which have the lowest levels of socioeconomic development globally, will experience more negative social, economic and environmental impacts and have fewer resources for dealing with them. In addition, LDCs are often poorly placed to engage with the political and administrative processes involved in accessing finance or implementing technical solutions. On top of this, they must contend with ever changing international agendas and the difficulty of making their voices heard. It is in this evolving context that countries have started identifying ways to
tackle climate change, using what is referred to as low carbon resilient development (LCRD). This describes an approach to development that seeks to integrate climate change mitigation (reducing greenhouse gas emissions), climate change adaptation (reducing the adverse effects of climate change) and sustainable development. The LCRD agenda was recognised in the fourth IPCC assessment report (IPCC 2007a) and gained further momentum when countries began developing their own LCRD frameworks. At both national and international level, and particularly in LDCs, policymakers are now actively devising strategies, plans and programmes that combine climate resilience with reduced carbon emissions. This transition has been influenced by several factors. First, LDC govern-
ments are increasingly aware of – and indeed experiencing – the impact of climate change; this includes its impact on development, such as growing poverty, loss of livelihoods and reduced socioeconomic well-being. Second, governments are also keen to harness the available international climate finance to achieve co-benefits from LCRD (Boyle 2013, Fisher et al. 2014). Third, many funders, particularly donor countries, have emphasised the integration of the mitigation and adaptation agendas as a means of ensuring the efficiency and coherence of climate change responses; treating
these agendas as separate is seen as a false dichotomy (Dessler and Parson 2010). Following the international climate change agreement reached in Paris,
France, in 2015, the focus of action is shifting from international debates to national and local governments. These governments now need to deliver on the ambitious promises made to reduce emissions and secure a climate resilient future for their populations. Understanding how these promises are likely to translate into action at national level is crucial, as is identifying the actions which have the best chance of success. In this book we analyse how national governments in LDCs have started
to identify LCRD solutions to climate change, including the financing and planning arrangements they put in place. Rather than taking a ‘surface’ approach, i.e. one that itemises institutions, policies and associated outcomes, we use a political economy lens to examine the actors, ideas, values and incentives that underlie these policy responses. Political economy drivers are the international-and national-level factors that shape the success or failure of climate change strategies and frameworks (Tanner and Allouche 2011). Actors’ interests, knowledge, networks and incentives help to determine whether LCRD responses are inclusive and reach the low-income communities that need most support. We argue that to ensure effective and equitable outcomes, actors must understand the influence of the political economy at multiple levels of analysis and governance. While much has been written on the international politics of climate
change (see Adger 2003; Tanner and Mitchell 2008; Giddens 2011), few studies examine how mitigation, adaptation and sustainable development agendas are brought together in national policies. Countries are using a variety of approaches to LCRD planning, including national strategies, Intended Nationally Determined Contributions1 (INDCs), development planning frameworks, green growth plans and climate change action plans. At the same time, institutional responsibility for climate change within countries has shifted. Whereas previously environment ministries were solely responsible for climate change responses, increasingly this responsibility is being distributed across agencies. A variety of special implementation arrangements have also been developed, including dedicated financial agencies and programmes such as Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs). While it is possible to identify the emergence of various distinct approaches
to LCRD, the process is neither uniform nor straightforward. As countries move from planning to implementation there are discrepancies between the visions they set out to achieve and reality. In some cases the adaptation and mitigation agendas continue to operate within separate policy ‘silos’, due to the practical and financial difficulty of linking them together. National governments taking a cross-sectoral approach also struggle to resolve priorities across the various ministries and departments involved. By viewing national planning and implementation processes from a political
economy perspective, this book provides new insights into the politics of
in
LCRD and climate change. In the following sections we explore the way in which LCRD is framed and review the existing literature on the topic; we also introduce the analytical framework and methods used in this book and provide an overview of its structure and the main findings. Chapter 2 then looks at the broad trends from national and international experiences on LCRD, before subsequent chapters present case studies of LCRD experiences in four of the LDCs.
