ABSTRACT
In the period after the Finnish war, up to Barbarossa, the general tone of the assessments was pretty much the same as before, even though some reports are worth attention. Air power was now as important as ships for naval warfare, if not more, and Germany's industrial potential was significantly larger than Britain's, especially considering that Germany now controlled much of the industrial resources of Western and Central Europe. Germany had the long run option to produce more air and naval military assets than they actually did, and as the subsequent developments of the war proved, it was possible to successfully make large-scale seaborne invasions even against relatively well-fortified opponents. Due to the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement, Soviet forces could occupy the Baltic States, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, during the summer of 1940. The Winter War had clearly demonstrated to the observers that their pre-war assessments basically were correct, and the war even worsened their perception of capabilities in certain respects.
