ABSTRACT
When the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) came to power in September 2009, it seemed that a new era of Sino-Japanese reconciliation would begin. The new ruling party not only boasted a more moderate stance on history issues than the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), but it also explicitly called for rapprochement with Beijing. Yet, under the DPJ government Japan experienced two severe crises in relations with China. The incidents in the East China Sea in 2010 and 2012 triggered a wave of anti-Japanese protests in the People's Republic of China (PRC) and contributed to a dramatic decrease in mutual trust between the two governments. This chapter analyzes to what degree the escalation of Sino-Japanese crises was influenced by the weakening of connections between the statespersons of both countries. It argues that the DPJ neglected semi-official channels of communication with China whose skillful use could have limited cognitive dissonance between Tokyo and Beijing.
