ABSTRACT
THE WAVE OF PROTESTS THAT SHOOK THE RUSSIAN CAPITAL and scores of Russian cities over the period 2011 to 2013 came as a great shock to the political establishment in the Kremlin. After decades of the passive acceptance of the status quo it appeared that civil society was at last wakening up. As Jensen notes, ‘after years of apathy, a new social forcethe Russian middle class-seemed to be emerging, with a message that included not only a political, but also a moral and emotional rejection of the corrupt authoritarian state that developed during the Putin era’ (Jensen 2013, p. 1). However, by July 2013 the steam seemed to have run out of the protest movement. As Treisman notes, ‘Whether one uses police figures (almost certainly too low) or those of the opposition (probably too high), the number demonstrating in Moscow each month [fell] sharply-from 210,000 in December 2011 to 5,500 in July 2013 (according to opposition reports), or 57,500 to 2,000 (according to the authorities)’ (Treisman 2013, p. 256). This collection examines these momentous developments which shook the political establishment over the period 2011 to 2013 in the Kremlin and it charts the rise and decline of the non-systemic opposition in Russia at both the national and regional levels. In the opening essay, Vladimir Gel’man discusses the following key questions: what
were the causes of the rebirth of the political opposition in Russia in the 2010s, and what are the factors that continue to drive this process? How and why did the opposition respond to major challenges and resolve (or not resolve) its problems? And what future is there for the political opposition in Russia? Gel’man puts forward the following key factors to explain the rebirth of the non-systemic opposition movement in December 2011. The first refers to Medvedev’s flawed modernisation which facilitated the politicisation of civil society and which attracted to the opposition camp former supporters of the regime who felt betrayed by the President’s broken promises to reform the economy and polity. The second stresses the importance of generational change and the influx of representatives of the younger generation who energised the protest movement. The third notes that there was a major shift in the opposition’s political strategy: a more populist form of resistance was developed which castigated the regime as
Turning to the factors which have argues that the movement became a victim of its own success. The course of protest events was so rapid that the highly fragmented opposition movement had neither the time nor the resources to keep up with the rapidly changing demands from civil society. The creation of a democratically elected Coordinating Council of the Opposition failed to bring the diverse strands of the opposition movement together. Gel’man stresses the negative impact of Putin’s re-election in March 2012 which he
argues came as a great blow to the protest movement. The Kremlin which originally had been caught off guard by the momentous events of December 2011 was now able to go on the counter offensive and seize back the initiative. Kremlin pressure on leaders and activists, accompanied by an aggressive Kremlin-sponsored propaganda campaign has severely weakened the movement. Support for the Putin regime has risen sharply in the wake of the crisis in Ukraine. The numbers of Muscovite protestors fell from 200,000 in December 2011 to 5,000 in July 2013. However, Gel’man argues that public demand for political change is likely to grow over time, ‘the impact of generational changes is not negligible, and the new leaders of the opposition will be able to learn from past mistakes’ (in this collection, p. 189). In an optimistic scenario he argues that Russia will indeed become a free country. The key questions are when and how this will happen, and at what costs. In his study, Richard Sakwa provides a detailed account of the rise and fall of the protest
movement. In particular, he focuses on the strategies employed by the Putin regime to regain control over the political agenda and to stifle the systemic and non-systemic opposition. He argues that since Putin’s return to office in May 2012, the regime has undergone three key overlapping phases: liberalisation, coercion and deconcentration. The period of liberalisation saw the implementation of a series of reforms which
Medvedev put forward in response to the mass protests against the regime. These included the return of gubernatorial elections, the introduction of a simplified procedure for the registration of political parties, the abolition of the requirement to collect signatures for elections to the State Duma and regional legislatures and a reduction in the number of voter signatures needed to participate in the presidential elections. The second response was coercion, which was applied against a select number of leading figures in the opposition. In addition, new legislation was adopted which clamped down on civil society and boosted conservative cultural and family values. The third response was deconcentration which entailed new forms of regime control accompanied by a sustained programme of ‘demedvedisation’. In addition, the new head of the Presidential Administration, Vyacheslav Volodin, developed a policy of ‘managed competition’ which allowed 54 newly-registered parties to participate in regional elections in 2013 and permitted Aleksei Naval’nyi to compete in the Moscow mayoral election in September 2013. Whilst Putin’s strategy has undoubtedly dealt a serious blow to both the systemic and non-systemic opposition, Sakwa argues that it has also revealed the vulnerability and insecurities of Russia’s dual-regime. Conflict within the ruling elite has led to stalemate, and Putin’s system of rule, if not the system itself, is now showing signs of exhaustion. In their contribution, Irina Busygina and Mikhail Filippov seek to understand why the
pro-democracy protests and support for political reforms have been limited to specific social groups and cities. As they note, over the period 2000 to 2013, there were scores of local demonstrations which were economic in nature. However, when it comes to protests in and other
very large cities. A 2012 opinion poll by of Russians (mostly residents of the largest cities) supported the idea of in-depth political reforms, leaving the remaining 80% either against democratic reforms or indifferent to the idea. Busygina and Filippov argue that high levels of social and economic inequality in Russia
have had an negative effect on public support for democratic reforms and that the heterogeneity of economic expectations across the federation has made it difficult to form a broad coalition in favour of democracy. In particular, they stress that poorer citizens have been wary of the economic risks which may accrue from political reforms. The Putin regime has been able to bolster its support by exploiting citizens’ fears about the detrimental impact of democracy on the economy. Thus, for example, in his 2012 presidential election manifesto Putin declared that any premature attempts to instigate a democratic system in Russia would be fraught with enormous economic risks. The instability brought about by democratic reforms, he argued, would inevitably lead to economic decline (Putin 2012a). Thus, Busygina and Filippov argue that only the affluent members of the middle class and the rich have been willing to face the costs and risks of political reforms. In a rather pessimistic conclusion, they stress that under the current economic slowdown in Russia there is little prospect of further large pro-democracy protests. However, they also stress that, if the regime is unable to guarantee the delivery of a minimum level of public goods and services, those social groups that currently have been reluctant to support political demands will participate in demonstrations to defend their standard of living. In his essay, Mikhail Dmitriev questions the dominant narrative of the protest movement.
According to this account, the electoral-cycle protests of 2011 to 2012 headed by the urban middle class manifested a transition to a new protest pattern which in many respects differed from the typical mobilisation pattern of the 1990s. Gradually, the role of the working class diminished, protests became concentrated in the capital and other large cities, and the demands of the protestors shifted from economic to civic and political issues. Dmitriev argues against this linear view of the protest movement with its original focus in the regions and its later transformation into a political movement in the capital. He argues that the 2009-2010 mobilisation episode may represent a partial reversal back to a province-based pattern with heavier working class involvement and predominantly economic demands. Furthermore he argues that the 2011-2012 protest pattern may not be sustained in the next potential mobilisation. According to this scenario the protests may be spearheaded by provincial working class protesters affected by economic slowdown. But regional protests may also involve political and nationalistic demands. Finally, Dmitriev argues that we may witness a coming together of working class regional protestors with members of the middle class in the capital which could set the scene for future broader cross-class protest coalitions. In her study Elena Chebankova argues that Western scholars often make the mistake of
conflating notions of Russia’s non-systemic liberal opposition and civil society. Such an approach, she argues, fails to take account of the fact that Russian society is composed of both traditionalists and liberals, and it is their dialogue and struggle for ideological hegemony which has determined the specific contours of Russia’s civil society. Thus, the analysis of Russia’s civil society she stresses must go beyond its traditional focus on the liberal non-systemic opposition. To illustrate these points Chebankova discusses three key areas, in which the ideas of liberals and traditionalist-conservatives are conflicting and world and
modernity; and approaches to the Chebankova demonstrates that a vast majority of Russians hold traditionalist values, believe in the benevolence of the state and support a more proactive stance in foreign and defence policies. However, the liberal wing, despite being in a minority, is well organised and bolstered by support from the most wealthy and educated groups in the population. Thus, the struggle between traditionalists and liberals in Russia is finely balanced. In their study of the middle class and democratisation Evgeny Gontmakher and Cameron
Ross argue that the Russian middle class is not a ‘class in itself’. Occupational, demographic and spatial divisions have weakened its class solidarity and questioned its role as a catalyst for democratic change. Moreover, they stress that middle class support for democracy is not universal but rather is contingent on a country’s specific socio-political and socio-economic conditions. Following Gill (1998), the authors stress the fact that the middle class comprises a much wider group of citizens than the bourgeoisie (which is primarily made up of private entrepreneurs), and includes high ranking members of the political elite, the state bureaucracy and managers in the state sectors of the economy, many of whom will have conflicting values. A crucial division is between those members of the middle class who depend on the state for their livelihood and those who work in the non-state sectors of the economy. Turning to an analysis of middle class support for democracy, Gontmakher and Ross
demonstrate that members of the middle class, particularly those members of the younger generation, express greater levels of support than members of the wider population for key democratic values. However, a majority of middle class members also support the view that Russia ‘needs a strong hand’ (Petukhov 2014), and members of the middle class have consistently given more support to United Russia, and to the Putin regime, than members of the general population. These results challenge the veracity of Moore’s famous aphorism, ‘No bourgeois, no democracy’ (Moore 1966, p. 418). In conclusion, Gontmakher and Ross argue that the existence of a middle class alone will
not ensure a democratic outcome. Middle class support for democracy will depend on such factors as the middle class’s origins, its size, its cohesiveness, its relationship to other classes, and crucially its relationship to the state. The interaction of these factors will have a major effect on the behaviour of the middle class which can be conservative (supporting the regime and the status quo), radical (calling for a change of regime) or passive (fearing the risk of destabilising the situation). In their study Regina Smyth and Sarah Oates examine variations in media use by regime
protestors and the participants of pro-Kremlin rallies. Their study challenges the conventional wisdom that anti-Kremlin protesters were predominantly consumers of new media while pro-Kremlin rally participants relied on state-controlled media. The conclusions of their study are based on surveys of more than 800 Russians who attended both protest and pro-regime types of street actions in late February and early March 2012, with a particular focus on their consumption of information both online and offline. The results of the study demonstrate that patterns of media use are more complex than
simply between online and offline or between state controlled and alternative media. Whilst a majority of protesters do rely on social media for political information, a significant plurality does not. Likewise, fewer than expected pro-Kremlin rally participants were consumers of state-controlled media. In regard to the gap between media messages of state of activists
systematically balanced state and whilst the results of their study do not support a deterministic division between offline and online media in Russia, it does suggest that the majority of activists tended to have a primary source of information, demonstrating that polarisation in Russian society is reinforced by media consumption. Irina Semenenko focuses on an often overlooked aspect of the protest movement in
Russia, the ethnic dimension. Bringing together the theoretical literature on contentious politics with that devoted to ethnicity and the politics of identity she discusses the ways in which ethnic issues can be integrated into the nation-building agenda. She concludes that building a civic nation is compatible with promoting ethnic identities if these are not manipulated to political and economic ends. However, forging and consolidating a civic nation in the largest multi-national federation
in the world is an extremely difficult task. Thus, for example, she cites data from the Sova Informational and Analytical Centre which recorded 1,575 acts of violence over the period 2009 to 2013. Moreover, in 2013 racist and neo-Nazi attacks left no fewer than 173 people injured and 20 killed, and 79 acts of vandalism motivated by hatred on ethnic grounds were recorded in 37 regions. Clashes in Kondopoga in the northern Republic of Karelia in 2006, in the small town of Pugachev in the southern Saratovskaya oblast’ and in Birulevo, a suburban district of Moscow, both in 2013, have brought ethnic problems to the forefront of contentious politics. Moreover, as Semenenko stresses, these clashes have helped to legitimate the nationalist
agenda. According to the Levada Centre in October 2013, 23% of respondents fully supported the idea of ‘Russia for Russians’, and a further 43% supported it to some extent, while only 19% rejected the slogan without reserve. The slogan ‘Stop feeding the Caucasus’ found 35% of respondents in full support and 36% offering partial support. The protest activities of 2011 to 2013 have also seen an alarming, albeit marginal involvement of extreme-right nationalist groups (Levada Centre 2013). In 2012 Putin published a manifesto article on the nationalities question which praised the
Russian people as ‘the pivots of a unique polyethnic civilization’ an idea that has been sharply criticised for its inconsistency with the concept of the ‘multi-national people’ enshrined in the Russian Constitution (Putin 2012b, p. 1). These and other more recent pronouncements of the President have done little to ameliorate ethnic tensions or bring further clarity to the Kremlin’s nationalities policy, its stance on the competing forms of ethnic and civic nationalism and the status of non-Russians within the federation. In the final essay, Tomila Lankina and Alisa Voznaya analyse the regional dimension of
Russia’s protests. They argue that the neglect of the regional dimension of protests has obscured important trends in protest dynamics, which may incrementally contribute to systemic political change. The key questions which they address are as follows: do the 2011 to 2013 protest events widely reported in the media represent isolated phenomena, mere ‘blips’ on Russia’s authoritarian political landscape or are they part of a much longerterm trend? Their study seeks to explore the deeper regional and temporal protest trends which
transcend the traditional focus on the protest movement in Moscow or St Petersburg. The empirical data of their study are gathered from the namarsh.ru website which covers the period 2007-2012. During this period, the authors recorded 4,726 protests, with a combined taking place in
Moscow and St Petersburg is confirmed the majority of Russia’s protests occurred outside of the two metropolises (Moscow and St Petersburg). They also show that there are significant temporal variations in the levels of protest activity with protests increasing in 2008 and 2009, and then gradually decreasing from 2010, with 2012 showing lower levels of protests than in 2007. In particular, their study focuses on the effects of socio-economic environments in
shaping the nature and propensity for protest in Russia’s 12 economic divisions. The conclusions of their study demonstrate that some regions are consistently over-represented in protest activism and that socio-economic factors have shaped both the intensity and the issue dimension of regional protest activism. Thus, for example, the data confirm their hypothesis that first, those economic divisions with the highest density of urban dwellers have the highest numbers of political protests, second, in those economic divisions which have the highest levels of private industry, protests over economic issues have been much more common, and third, in economic divisions with high proportions of state workers there is a lower turnout at protests. Lankina and Voznaya also created a ‘suppression’ category, which measures the attempts
of state authorities or pro-government groups to disrupt a protest and carry out repressive activities against protestors and their study shows that 26% of Russian protests met with some kind of repression. Those areas with the largest number of protests not surprisingly came top of the suppression list: Moscow City, St Petersburg, Moscow oblast’, Samara, Krasnodar and Penza. The results also confirm the authors’ prediction that politically motivated protests in urban areas are likely to face higher rates of suppression. Finally, their study demonstrates that the North Caucasus region has the highest suppression rate (25%). The Ural and Central divisions are second and third at 22% and 19% respectively. The lowest rates of suppression were to be found in the Central Black Earth division (5%) and Far Eastern division (10%).
