ABSTRACT
RUSSIA WAS AMONG MANY COUNTRIES HIT BY PROTEST mobilisations in the aftermath of the Great Recession. Changes in the patterns of political mobilisation seemed to go hand-inhand with attitude change and shifts in the social structure, such as the emergence of a mass urban middle class. These developments stimulated a lively academic debate on the relationships between the patterns of protest, the nature of the political regime, attitude change and social modernisation. Economic success does not preclude the expansion of protest activity; for example, in China since 1994 the annual number of protest events has grown even faster than per capita Gross Domestic Product and in 25 years increased by a factor of 20.1 Mature liberal democracies also seem to be conducive to protest mobilisations, which allowed Meyer et al. (1998) to define them as ‘movement’ societies. In a recent study of 283 mobilisation episodes from 1900 to 2012, Beissinger and Putnam (2014) conclude that revolutions have become more frequent and have given rise to a new urban model centring on civic purposes rather than goals of social transformation. This model assumes a transition to different tactics (from rural-based rebellions to mass protests in urban spaces) and a different class composition of protesters (from peasants and workers to the urban middle class). Robertson (2011) argues that different types of political regime may be associated with
specific protest patterns, which will depend on the geography, protest repertoire, demands and social composition of the protesters. Robertson and many other authors point to the critical role of the emerging urban middle class in this transformation. Studies of recent mobilisation episodes from central Europe and north Africa allow us to capture various phases of such transformation (Beissinger et al. 2012; Beissinger & Sasse 2014). Russia, with its spatial dimensions, economic volatility, social dynamism, diversity of
protest events and rich sociological databases, represents an interesting case for empirical validation of the theories of political mobilisation. Patterns of protests in Russia seemed to have been strongly affected by ongoing social transformation which was fostered by spectacular growth of household consumption during the 2000s. It is a well proven fact that the Moscow middle class played a leading role in the protests against unfair elections during 2011 and 2012 (Dmitriev 2012; Robertson 2013; Chaisty & Whitefield 2013; Vogel 2013). This can give some vital clues to understanding the relationship between the transformation
of protest patterns and the progress of in spatial terms the transformation of protest patterns in Russia was accompanied by a shift of protest activity from the provincial periphery to the major urban centres, including the capital. Theoretically, that may also imply that the setbacks or reversals of social modernisation may correspond to the opposite centrifugal movements of protests away from the capital and other largest cities. The 2011-2012 protests against unfair elections in Russia were underpinned by far
reaching attitude changes (Dmitriev 2012; Robertson 2013; Vogel 2013). In our recent article (Dmitriev & Misikhina 2013) we provide evidence that accelerated growth of consumption in Russia during the 2000s has dramatically reduced absolute poverty and has nearly bridged the gap between Russia and advanced economies in per capita consumption of food and consumer durables. It also was associated with a gradual shift from a dominant survival-oriented value setting, towards self-expression values and human development priorities. However, that transformation seems to have remained incomplete. Relatively recent de-anchoring from the previous value system has not left enough
time for the new value system to become established. To achieve stability, new values, attitudes and priorities need to be embedded in social routines, habits and traditions. Such re-anchoring may take some time to complete. In the meantime, the fragility of values and attitudes may increase the probability of sudden swings and reversals of social priorities and behavioural patterns. This essay provides some evidence from our 2013 survey (Dmitriev & Misikhina 2013) and other empirical sources that such swings do happen in Russia and that they may affect future protest behaviour and protest geography. The data in consideration cast doubt on a steady and gradual interpretation of protest transformation in Russia as presented by Robertson (2011, 2013).
