ABSTRACT
In this chapter I argue that some core phenomenological insights, especially the emphasis on direct perception of intentional behavior and some basic emotions, are a necessary but not sufficient condition for an adequate account of intersubjectivity and social cognition. I take it that an adequate account of intersubjectivity must involve substantial interaction with empirical studies, notwithstanding the putative methodological differences between phenomenological description and scientific explanation. As such, I explicate what kind of phenomenology survives, and, indeed, thrives, in a milieu that necessitates engagement with the relevant sciences, albeit not necessarily deference to them. Not only do phenomenological accounts of intersubjectivity provide significant conceptual and epistemological resources that have been overlooked, but I also argue, more controversially, that they provide the basis for a better explanation of an array of empirical data than existing inferentialist or mind-reading accounts of social cognition (notably Theory Theory, Simulation Theory and hybrid versions).
