chapter  2
SOVIET INTERESTS IN THE RED SEA
Pages 23

Thoughthisimageofflexibilityisbeingwidely advertisedbytheSoviets,onecannothelpremarking thateventsinAfrica,SouthwesternAsiaand elsewhereintheThirdWorlddonotunequivocably confirmaSovietevolutiontowardsamoreflexible model.ContrarytowhatAspaturianseemstoassume, ThirdWorldcountries'"deviations"fromcommunist orthodoxyareduetotheirgrowingnationalismand nottogrowingSovietflexibility.Thewaythe Polishcrisisisbeingmanagedisnotsignificant either.foritistheresultoftheweaknessofthe PolishcommunistpartyandtheUSSR'sweakness ratherthanflexibility.So,wecometoourpoint, namelytothelimitsofSovietpower,whateverits purposesmaybe.