ABSTRACT
The various chapters have not used a common analytical framework for analysis and there is variation between the chapters, with some being more theoretical and others more empirical and case-study oriented, thus providing different perspectives. The hydropolitical landscapes of the Nile Basin are not confined to the basin’s borders and as many of the chapters in this book show, the hydropolitical landscapes of the Nile are in fact comprised by several ‘landscapes’ that are influenced, as in the past, by actors and factors far away from the Nile Basin itself. Several contributions underscore the complexity and the ‘messiness’ of hydropolitics, and take their point of departure in understanding the hydropolitics of the River Nile as manifestations of negotiated social practices located both locally and globally and within wider contexts of history, politics and economy. Framing the analysis in this way makes it possible to elucidate how, for instance, various political, economic and legal conflicts intertwine and how relations within and between the riparian states of the Nile River
Basin have developed over time. In such contexts political and cultural symbols of identity, power and nationalism are often brought into play in shaping the outcomes of the resource system. Several chapters combine both historical and contemporary perspectives and some chapters take the Nile Basin, part of the basin or a country in the basin as a point of departure for the analysis, whereas others put more emphasis on how the Nile Basin hydropolitics are related to developments ‘outside’ the Nile Basin geography. The book also analyses the land-and water-related investments, both from the perspective of the investor as well as the investee, and highlights the power struggles between and within the riparian states of the River Nile Basin. With regards to the latter aspect, the very terminology used in discourses – by activists, academics, investors and politicians – also reflect and are part of wider geo-political landscapes, with subsequent implications to ongoing land-and water-related processes. As indicated, Mark Twain once said: ‘Buy land, they’re not making it anymore’, and private individuals, business enterprises and governmental agencies seem to follow this advice and, if impossible to buy, then hiring or leasing is the second best option. The complexity on the ground is, however, challenging simple conceptualizations of these processes. ‘Investment’ or ‘acquisition’ is the preferred term for investors, entrepreneurs and even facilitating governments since it alludes to positive development, whereas the terms ‘land grab’ and ‘water grab’ allude to the negative consequences. Although the terms are often used interchangeably in the literature, the two notions are still different. Not all land deals are investments in a strict sense and not all agricultural investments involves land deals (Cotula, 2013: 7) and, as Cotula says, ‘the polarized debates about the land rush ultimately reflect competing visions about the future of world agriculture, and particularly about the roles of small-and large-scale farming’ (Cotula, 2013: 5). From the perspective of the people affected, ‘[l]and grabbing (and associated other forms of grabbing) constitutes a recent intensification of an historic threat to rural livelihoods, to democratic governance and equity, and to long-term environmental sustainability’ (Edelman et al., 2013: 1529). Elaborating along these lines, Borras and Franco (2013) argue that ‘land grabbing’ means ‘the capturing of control of relatively vast tracts of land and other natural resources through a variety of mechanisms and forms, carried out through extra-economic coercion that involves large-scale capital’.
