ABSTRACT
On Dieter Henrich's reading, Johann Gottlieb Fichte's insight into the deficiency of the reflection theory results in a dramatic break in the modern philosophical theory of self-consciousness. The guiding exegetical thesis of Henrich's piece is that the overall development of Fichte's thinking, as documented in the successive versions of the Wissenschaftslehre, is to be interpreted as a progressive analysis of the concept of the I. Drawing on an optical metaphor, Henrich brings the peculiar self-identity of the I under the formula of the I's essence as 'reflection'. On Henrich's account, Fichte was the first to perceive the explanatory failure of the traditional reflection theory of the I, which, according to Henrich, even marred Immanuel Kant's account of the matter. Henrich's overall assessment is that the increasing insight into the constitution of the gained by Fichte goes together with the growing difficulty of comprehending and lending intelligibility to the structures and functions so found.
