ABSTRACT
Episodic memory contrasted both with nondeclarative memory, devoted in part to skills and habits, and, within the category of declarative memory, with semantic memory, devoted to general facts. This definition was broadly compatible with traditional analyses of what philosophers had referred to as recollective, experiential, or personal memory, including the popular causal theory. Empirical research within the mental time travel (MTT) framework has revealed a wealth of commonalities between episodic memory and future-oriented mental time travel (FMTT), leaving no doubt that there is some sort of tight relationship between them. This chapter surveys the evidence and arguments to which continuists and discontinuists have appealed. It describes plausible versions of continuism and discontinuism. It provides a brief overview of the psychological evidence for each view. The chapter provides a more detailed review of philosophical arguments for discontinuism, and sets out continuist critiques of those arguments. It discusses one promising discontinuist response to continuist critiques.
