ABSTRACT
Buddhist philosophy puts forward a revisionary metaphysics. This chapter focuses on an account of episodic memory and its ownership. It discusses Vasubandhu's Refutation of a Theory of the Self, who is an exemplar of the Buddhist-Abhidharma revisionary metaphysics. Furthermore, in his later writings Vasubandhu has a strategy to sidestep the Strawsonian criticism of the no-ownership view. The chapter focuses on his arguments against the Nyaya-Vaisesikas as that discussion revolves around the self as the subject/owner of experiences and thoughts. The Nyaya-Vaisesikas argue that the no-self theory cannot explain our episodic memory experiences. The chapter looks at recent empirical work in psychology to suggest a new way of thinking about episodic memories. It shows how Vasubandhu, particularly in his post-Abhidharma writings, and provides a satisfactory account of memory and as well side-steps the criticisms raised by the no-ownership theorists.
