ABSTRACT

Introduction Extent research found that nancing decisions in family rms and the resulting capital structure dier substantially from those of their nonfamily counterparts (e.g. Croci et al. 2011; Romano et al. 2000; Schmid 2013; Koropp et al. 2014). Surprisingly, there is less agreement about the direction of the eect. While several studies reported that (some types of) family rms use more debt (e.g. Romano et al. 2000; Croci et al. 2011; Gottardo and Moisello 2014), others found the opposite eect (e.g. McConaughy et al. 2001; Schmid 2013; Ampenberger et al. 2013) or no systematic eect (e.g. Anderson and Reeb 2003). Several theoretical explanations for dierences in debt ratios have been proposed of which the specic control motivations of family owners rank ahead.