ABSTRACT
Introduction The ability of opposition parties to freely organize, disseminate their views, and compete in elections is a cardinal principle of democratic theory and practice. Non-democratic regimes do not permit the formation of opposition parties and exclude them from the political process. In established democracies, opposition parties can check the power of the government, serve as major institutional channels for the expression of dissent and criticism, and play a vital role in shaping public policies. The effectiveness of opposition parties largely depends on their ability to come to power and control the government either alone or through coalition partnerships with other parties. The success of the political opposition in bringing about a change in government is important for the functioning of democratic processes. As Scheiner suggests, turnover in office as the result of an electoral victory by the political opposition is “the gold standard” in party competition, since it “indicates that accountability genuinely exists, thereby increasing the pressure on parties to act responsibly to the public” (Scheiner 2006: 9). Those opposition parties that fail to enter government for an extended period are likely to face growing organizational and electoral problems. Parties that are confined to the role of semi-permanent opposition have difficulty recruiting attractive candidates in elections, maintaining the unity of their organizations, and playing an important role in the country’s political life. In short, the chronic failure of political opposition can compromise many of Merkel’s (2004) “partial regimes” of democracy that are developed in the opening chapter, including the electoral system itself. One should note at the outset that the record of established democracies with respect to the frequency of turnover in office varies considerably. In a number of democratic countries, there is relatively frequent alternation in power by major parties. This is the case, for example, in the two-party system of the USA where the Republican and Democratic parties have regularly alternated in power. Between 1952 and 2014, the Republicans and the Democrats controlled the presidency for 36 and 26 years, respectively. In addition to the presidency, the two major American parties have also alternated in controlling the Congress over time. In the United Kingdom there has been a similar trend: the Conservative
and Labour parties have taken turns in controlling governmental power. During the past 30 years, the relatively long tenure of the Conservatives in office, from 1979 to 1997, was first followed by a period of Labour Party dominance, from 1997 to 2010, and then by the Conservative Party’s return to power through a coalition government in 2010. In both the USA and the UK, alternation in office has meant that the main opposition party was not excluded from the government for a very long time (Scheiner 2006). Party politics in several other established democracies display a somewhat different trend: the same party establishes its dominance and stays in power without turnover in government through several elections (Pempel 1990). But the changing electoral preferences of the voters eventually lead to a new phase marked by increased competitiveness in the party system that eventually ends one-party dominance. This has been the case, for example, in Italy where the Christian Democratic Party remained in power through various coalition arrangements between 1945 and 1992, in Sweden where the Social Democratic Party governed continuously from 1946 to 1976, and in Israel where the Labor Party served as the senior partner of the coalitions during the years between 1948 and 1977. Japanese politics offers the case of an extremely long tenure in office by the same party and protracted opposition failure: Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) controlled political power continuously for four decades between 1955 and 1993 (Scheiner 2006; Musil 2014). Since the beginning of multiparty politics in the late 1940s, Turkey has experienced three periods of relatively long incumbency of the same party. The first was from 1950 to 1960 when the center-right Demokrat Parti (Democratic Party, DP) remained in office after winning three consecutive elections. But its tenure was cut short by the 1960 military coup. The second was the eight-year-long governance of the center-right Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party, ANAP) between 1983 and 1991. After winning the 1983 and 1987 elections, ANAP formed majority party governments based on comfortable parliamentary majorities. ANAP’s tenure in office ended as a result of the 1991 parliamentary elections when its chief rival for the center-right votes, Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party, DYP) finished first and replaced ANAP in power through a coalition government. The third and most recent case is the uninterrupted incumbency of the Islamicoriented Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party, AKP) since 2002. After scoring successive electoral victories, the AKP set a new record for the longest majority party governance in contemporary Turkish politics. During the AKP’s long tenure in office, political opposition remained fragmented, weak, and disunited. Turkey’s main opposition party, the center-left Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party, CHP), has lagged far behind the AKP in the four elections held since 2002. The country’s second opposition party, the far-right Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party, MHP), has similarly failed to mount a serious electoral challenge to the AKP. Consequently, both the CHP and the MHP have been excluded from power for more than a decade. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze opposition failure in Turkey and its implications for the consolidation of democracy.
