ABSTRACT
Ukraine's participation in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is characterised by several paradoxes. First, the ENP was conceived as a framework for engagement for Ukraine as an alternative to enlargement. The second paradox is that, while critical of the policy, Ukraine successfully used the ENP to upgrade its bilateral relations with the European Union (EU) to that of an Association Agreement. The third paradox is that while Ukraine was a demandeur in relations with the EU, the Ukrainian authorities have been slow in implementing domestic reforms – an essential pre-condition for integration with the EU. The fourth paradox is that Russia's punitive actions against Ukraine's European choice vastly increased Ukraine's dependency on the EU, imbuing the latter with disproportionate influence – something that the ENP on its own failed to achieve. The chapter analyses Ukraine's participation in the ENP to illuminate these four paradoxes. As during enlargement, the ENP/Eastern Partnership formula continues to be 'reforms now, benefits later'.
