ABSTRACT
The orthopraxy of Roman ritual is often remarked upon, by both ancient and modern observers. This chapter explores the cognitive roots of Roman orthopraxy by appeal to “overimitation,” the cross-culturally well-attested tendency of children and adults to imitate with very high fidelity. Overimitation is widely seen as crucial to the transmission of cultural practices, which often consist of action sequences that are teleologically and causally opaque; that is, directed toward no transparent end and having no transparent causal efficacy as means. No “rational” imitator, motivated by an instrumental means-ends calculus, would imitate such actions. Without overimitation, cultural practices characterized by teleological and causal opacity, lacking transparent instrumental value, would presumably not achieve wide distribution. I submit that the orthopraxy of teleologically and causally opaque Roman cult is ideally suited to explanation by way of overimitation. In addition to explaining Roman orthopraxy, the findings on overimitation help explain the Roman penchant for multiple etiologies. For the opaque yet clearly intentional actions of cult lacked not only intuitive rationale but also authoritative explanation. In these conditions, multiple etiologies represented a cognitively autonomous search for explanations. Finally, overimitation helps explain the paradoxical ritual change to which Roman cult was subject. For overimitation preserved opaque ritual technologies for addition, amendment, and innovation in the face of new religious exigencies. Only in a system of faithfully preserved ritual is the accumulation of new ritual forms that build upon the old possible. Finally, my cognitive study of Roman ritual allows me to offer a solution to a problem in overimitation studies. For the underlying motivation that drives overimitation is disputed. On the “causal” account, imitators encode opaque actions as non-obvious but causally indispensable components in an overall action sequence, so they imitate with precision. The “normative” account holds that imitators encode opaque actions as mandated by group norms, and thus imitate with high fidelity. The related “affiliative” account proposes that imitators copy with high fidelity in order to connect or affiliate with others or with a social group. I attempt to reconcile these competing theories by suggesting that affiliation with others, which regularly includes endorsing a group’s norms, is often causal, but the causality is psychological and social rather than physical. Roman cult represents par excellence a context of interaction among individuals, divine and human, in which only conventional actions properly performed by properly affiliated agents are capable of causing the requisite psychological and social effects, such as placating a god or creating a priest, respectively. Thus, some overimitation results not from confusion about physical causality but from accurate social-cognitive intuitions and pragmatic competence with respect to psychological and social causality.
