ABSTRACT
Wittgenstein Thoughts about truth are apt to be confined by two idealized models of justification. The first is the linear model, in which predicate ascription on a given occasion is justified by inference from something else supported, in turn, by inference from something further. The second is the coherence model which offers justification freed from the idea of a terminus. Rejecting the idea of ultimate evidential grounds, Wittgenstein substitutes the idea of human action underpinning the certainty of beliefs. Self-evidence or incorrigibility might aid the linear model, and the assignment of truth-values by correspondence prior to consistency screening might help coherence; one may forego truth and settle for warranted assertibility. Epistemology must shifted away from thoughts of a terminus in evidence and should focus on the explanation of entrenchment itself. James's conception of the 'pragmatic mediation' of beliefs should shifted away from the justification of true beliefs; 'certainty' is a consequence of pragmatic constraints on action, not of truth-determining argument.
