ABSTRACT
The modern sceptic, or epistemological sceptic, is made to argue that knowledge is impossible, to insist that authors cannot know anything, to affirm that it is true or can be known that knowledge is not possible. A criticism of contemporary debate on (epistemological) scepticism is that it does not seem to take into account the dynamics of standard fluctuations. But fluctuations affect the application of all so-called closure-expressions, such as 'conelusive evidence', 'incorrigible statement', 'indubitable utterance', and 'definite establishment of truth'. The sceptic's reasoning is considered intuitively false and yet logically impeccable that his arguments are subjected to close and careful epistemological scrutiny. Let one first consider those arguments that claim the existence of conclusive, unretractable, irrevocable evidence. The relevance and strength of these reflections can be assessed more clearly if authors first ask, in a preliminary way, where authors are in the dialogue, what stage authors have reached.
