ABSTRACT
This chapter examines the features of the first person by heuristically invoking some arguments for and against the inextrudability of the personal pronouns. There is a direct way of seeing how one's personal predicates depend upon personal pronouns for at least part of their problematic nature. Given their present conventions one might say that the so-called group of personal predicates must function in coupling with demonstrative or introductory term. It seems to the author that there exist some bona fide asymmetric features of one's self-referential speech devices, which may themselves be related to the troublesome asymmetry between self-ascriptions and other-ascriptions: related, that is, to scepticism about Persons. It is obviously unlikely that one's difficulty with persons could be stated without at least the distinction between self-reference and other-reference. And, because there are certain other features to personal pronouns, people had better stay with them on the chance that these features contribute to the paradoxes though they are irrelevant for self-reference.
