ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses the second person, as asymmetrical a phenomenon as is the first person, that there is a symmetrical asymmetry between them. This argument might then serve as a reductio of the position which finds the self asymmetrically placed. It focuses on the proprietariness of certain of one's states, which seems utterable with the use of only third person indices or even person-neutral indices rather than self-referential ones. The author suggests that the proprietariness and uniqueness which is wrongly claimed to be characteristic of some self-ascription, and without which the personal paradoxes cannot stand, are linked to the proprietariness and uniqueness of the first person device as it is. The proprietariness and uniqueness of a self-ascription as opposed to other-ascription produces the rub from which spring the sceptic's claims. And if people could show their personal demonstratives to be not category-different or not sceptic-productive, then by modus tollens they might show any such contrast views to be mistaken.
