ABSTRACT
This chapter examines the epistemological root of first person asymmetry since the reductio which results in accepting fully its consequences serves only as symptom that all is not being said as it should be said. The sceptic's problems about persons cannot be stated independently of the context of contrasted reports, or of private situation in contrast with an external situation, or stated independently of contrast of a first person with second or third person situation. The possibility of such contrast or asymmetry rides upon operability of conventional form of interchange, between the persons. It is the interchange itself which is said to function asymmetrically. Without this interchange there could be no grounds for arguing for or against personal contrasts, no grounds for the sceptic's reservation as to the symmetries among speaker and hearer. Thus if the contrast between selves and others is to yield an epistemological asymmetry, it first yield an asymmetry within a speaker and hearer situation.
