ABSTRACT
A large number of contemporary philosophers in English speaking countries are agreed in regarding epistemology as part of analytic philosophy, and the problem of perception, in connection with which the whole question of the given arises, as a particular area amenable to analytic discipline. But while there is some measure of agreement with regard to the methods to be employed, i.e. the analysis of such concepts as 'knowing', 'seeing', 'believing', 'certainty', etc. and even some measure of accommodation between those who would wish to analyse these concepts in terms of ordinary language and usage, and those who would prefer to analyse them by setting up some sort of ideal language or technical terminology which would more adequately exhibit the true relationship between these different concepts, there is little agreement regarding the purpose for which such an analysis should be undertaken. This lack of agreement regarding the purposes for which the analysis of cognitive concepts is to be undertaken, has important bearings upon the question of the given. For this reason we shall investigate one or two of the main approaches that have crystallised with regard to this matter.
