The Knowledge-Situation

THE problem of knowledge, broadly considered, is unquestionably the most absorbing problem for the classical modern philosophers and it continues to bulk large in contemporary philosophy. The problem is enormously intricate, and has come to embrace a great variety of subsidiary and related problems such as the problems of method, sense-perception, the function of reason in knowledge, and the criterion of truth. The array of problems is bewildering and one is certain to become lost in the maze of epistemology unless one restricts the area of exploration or adopts some leading thread to guide his steps. I propose, accordingly, in dealing with the crucial questions of epistemology, to adopt as my leading conception that of cognitive transcendence-the reference of all knowledge to something beyond itself. A peculiarity of knowledge is that it is always of or about an actual or supposed object other than itself. Referential transcendence is, I shall contend, an essential and indispensable feature of all knowledge-a feature which is in large measure responsible for the peculiar structure of the knowledge-situation. I shall attempt to describe in the present chapter the characteristic pattern of knowledge which is repeated with variations in the several sub-types of cognition. There are no doubt many ways of classifying knowledge, but certainly one of the most fruitful is to enumerate the types of knowledge according to the character of the object cognized. Thus perception is the apprehension of a supposed outer reality, memory is the recollection of past perceptual objects or past experiences of the remembering subject, conception is directed toward abstract systems and universals. These instances of

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an ultimate, irreducible, and hence inexplicable property of the knowing mind on a par with intensity, duration, extent, and other basic features of consciousness. Nevertheless, cognitive transcendence admits of a purely psychological explanation in so far as the referential function of knowledge may be considered a specification of a general property of conscious experience, namely "intent" or "intentionality" which characterizes, besides the cognitive, the volitional and perhaps other phases of the mental life. Volitional activity is directed towards its goal or "objective" precisely as knowledge is directed towards its object. "Intent" may very properly designate that self-transcendence of the immediately given involved in every desire, wish, purpose, or act of intellectual apprehension. Certainly the verb "intend" and the corresponding substantives "intent" and "intention" are commonly employed both in the conative and in the cognitive senses. The question, "What is your intention 2" may in a certain context mean "What is your purpose 2" but under other circumstances it may mean merely: "What are you referring to 2" Intent, intention, reference, and meaning (in the referential sense) are virtually synonymous. The usefulness of the term "intent" arises from its dual cognitive and conative import; it suggests the essential similarity between cognition and other referential situations, and that reference is a characteristic common to many diverse types of situation in which mind is a participant. Desireexcept in certain pathological cases in which it is apparently objectless-is always desire for something. A purpose is always directed toward its goal however abstract, ideal, and inarticulate; knowledge is of or about something; and even emotions are ordinarily attached to some object or other. The objects of desire, will, cognition, and emotion may not and frequently do not enjoy actual and literal existence. Thus the objects of desire and volition are in the nature of the case inexistent at the moment of desire or volition, and the objects of conception and imagination are merely envisaged without being actualized at the time. The appearance of intentional

for, and emotional reactions towards various objects, real and imaginary, but we can scarcely be said to have pleasures of, for, or towards anything. The prepositions expressing reference are not appropriate in connection with hedonic feelings because these seem to subsist in their own right in a "subjective" realm without being directed towards anything beyond themselves. Are not the feelings of pleasantness and unpleasantness devoid of that self-transcendence which characterizes the rest of the mental and are we not, as a consequence, faced with the dilemma of either excluding them entirely from the mental realm-which is an exceedingly arbitrary procedure-or else repudiating the definition of the mental in terms of intent? There is, I believe, an escape from this dilemma if pleasantness and its opposite are considered not primary ingredients of consciousness on a par with sensations, perceptions, emotions, etc., but rather affective qualities of the latter. The substantives pleasure and pain should be replaced by the adjectives pleasant and unpleasant respectively. The substantival view of the older hedonistic psychology that pleasure and pain exist in their own right and mingle on a basis of equality with the other inhabitants of the psychological world is to be rejected in favour of the view that they live an attributive and parasitic existence in the realm of mind. There are no pure pleasures and no pure pains, but instead pleasant and unpleasant colours, sounds, tastes, odours, and emotions. Although pleasure and pain are not substantive states of consciousness possessing intent, they are always associated with other primary states which are themselves intentional. Intent may therefore, without reservation or exception, be considered a pervasive and defining property of consciousness both in its cognitive and non-cognitive aspects. Cognitive transcendence is not, to be sure, explained in any ultimate sense through its subsumption under intent, but when so considered it ceases to be a mysterious and isolated phenomenon.