ABSTRACT
We may begin by putting forward as a provisional description of a universal that it is what is common to all objects which we normally call by the same name, e.g., whatever is common to all objects which we normally call by the name 'table'. That, it should be noted, is not offered as a definition of what a universal is. As a definition it could hardly be accepted without begging at least two major questions in the history of the subject: first, can there be a universal common to a group of objects, even if they have no common name? And secondly, can there be universals without instances? If our statement were taken as a definition, the answer to both questions would have to be No. But prima facie such an answer to the first question seems absurdly wrong, and although disagreement about a negative answer to the second question has been wider, yet it has, after all, been disagreement; it would hardly, therefore, be correct at this stage so to define a universal as to make such disagreement impossible.
