ABSTRACT
W e have seen earlier, in Chapter I, that it is too transparent to argue that all cases o f self-ascription will be asymmetrical to other-ascriptions. This would be the case o f the too-lonely ‘I’. It is consequently a corollary to the position which holds there is something substantive to first-person asymmetry that it be limited to a sub-class o f self-ascriptions. Unless the game is to be up at once there must be at least something I have in common with others. Plurals are necessary. Hence it is held that only a sub-class o f self-ascriptions differs from material body ascriptions in a type-distinct way. The remainder o f the class o f self-ascriptions is part o f the larger class o f material body ascriptions. In this way it has been claimed there are Minds and Bodies, my body in a class with others; or there are P-properties, or Psychical properties, and M-properties, my Material properties in a class with others.
