ABSTRACT
Despite Mike McNamee (2010: 235) identifying material of mine on rules, along with similar material of John Russell’s, as already of relevance to the philosophy of officiating for sport, I remain unsure what to look for from an intervention into such a project – or even into its ethics (for which McNamee, 2010: 235, asked). Perhaps Russell knows. Certainly, he claims that, “[w]hat umpires do is philosophically fascinating” (Russell, 2004: 87). And, at one time, Russell and I both recognised that the role of the official in sport – the referee, umpire or judge – was less about the making of rules (by interpreting them, through their application to this case) than about determining, from a principled reading of this case, what the rules really said. Moreover, our expositions both drew on ideas from Ronald Dworkin.1 And, since Russell (1999: 34) speaks approvingly of thoughts from Dworkin as offering “a rough framework for a theory of umpire discretion”, there may at least be mileage in looking to the form Russell assumes such a philosophy of officiating will take. Thus I will develop my position by reference to some details in two of Russell’s papers. Yet, lest I be thought too fractious, I will also clarify some of what Russell and I share (or, at least, where we appear to agree, despite some differences of nuance).
