ABSTRACT
As the year 1955 came to a close, Operation Alpha was once again in a state of uncertainty. In Washington, Francis Russell was concerned that the Israelis
regarded the present time as very unfavourable from their point of view for negotiating a settlement and might be unable to resist the temptation deliberately to sabotage the whole operation by revealing the Egyptian position and forcing Nasser to disavow it.
These developments, Russell believed, required a quickening of the steps in Operation Alpha.It might be best to concentrate, for the time being, on getting Nasser to cover the not very great distance between his present position and what we regard as a basis for a settlement, and then put the maximum pressure on Israel to accept it. 1
The Americans also feared that Britain's continuing interest in strengthening and expanding the Baghdad Pact might not only annoy the Russians but might also further antagonize Colonel Nasir. 2