ABSTRACT
After three years of failed UN mediation attempts, with little coercion or initiative from the Western powers, the Arab-Israeli deadlock of the early 1950s began showing increasing signs that it could not remain a low-grade, manageable conflict indefinitely. United Nations peacekeeping via the UNTSO and the MACs was being strained to the limit, and the risk oflocalized border incidents flaring up into a more serious outbreak of hostilities increased sharply from 1952 to 1954.1
The focus of international efforts at promoting Arab-Israeli negotiation during these years shifted to the UN General Assembly and the Secretary-General. The initiative came from the Israeli side, in part as a response to the uncomfortable situation caused by the enduring no-peace, no-war situation. Despite internal disagreements over the wisdom of such an approach, Israel's representatives at the UN and in Western capitals embarked on a vigorous campaign aimed at compelling the Arabs to sit down to direct talks.
