ABSTRACT
Since the Japanese surrender, the Attlee government had con sidered the problems of South-East Asia to have been of second ary importance compared to the problems in Europe, the Middle East and India. However, at the end of January 1946 the region went right to the top of the cabinet’s agenda. During talks in Washington, the British Minister of Food had learnt that the world production of grains had been overestimated and that a shortage of 5 million tons of wheat could be expected during the next year. Apart from expected shortfalls in Germany, both South-East Asia and India would be seriously affected because of crop losses and procurement failures on the subcontinent.1 On 31 January, cabinet ministers were further told that South-East Asia was now facing famine because of a worldwide shortage of rice, the main diet of the region. The estimated supply of 3.1 million tons of rice was 0.7 million tons below the expected annual world demand of 3.8 million tons (excluding Japan’s requirements of 1 m illion tons).2 Due to the shortage of wheat, rice could not be replaced by other crops. The gravity of the situation was brought to the world’s attention when on 11 February the United Nations General Assembly urged all governments to take immediate and drastic action against the worldwide shortage of food.3 Four days earlier, Britain had already announced the introduction of bread rationing and the cessation of her rice imports.
