ABSTRACT
After the disappointing news emanating from Paris and Wash ington in the early spring of 1949, fresh reports from Delhi encouraged the British to step up their South-East Asian initiative. According to the British High Commissioner in Delhi at the end of March, Nehru’s proposals for an Asian regional organisation had not been accepted by the smaller states of South and South-East Asia.1 Many of the countries whose delegates at Delhi had originally welcomed Nehru’s initiative had apparently been intimidated by the Soviet Union’s condemnation of the Delhi Conference. Even more significant was the fact that most Asian states generally mistrusted Indian intentions. Since inde pendence, Indian prestige had suffered greatly as a result of her military intervention in Kashmir, and the continuing conflict with Pakistan over the disputed border province. As Dening explained to the Foreign Office’s new Permanent Under-Secretary, Sir William Strang, Nehru wanted to ‘take the lead in building up a “united Asia front” on lines which may not be entirely dissimilar from our own views on the subject’. However, Dening added, the response had not been very eager. The Indian Prime Minister had cast his net too wide, and India was not much loved in Asia. Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma all feared India, and Thailand as well was afraid of being overlaid. Nor did India have the necessary know-how, judgement and tact to lead a united Asian front.2 Instead, Dening believed that ‘We are the obvious people to take the initiative in this matter, and if we play the hand skilfully, there is no reason why we should not succeed where India is likely to fail.’3
