ABSTRACT
The following example describes something seldom envisioned in planning for community emergencies: groups of private citizens carrying out important disaster tasks. This particular disaster is a brush fire in Southern California, but it could have been any type of emergency anywhere in the United States.
Abetted by drought, arsonists, and fierce Santa Ana winds, the worst fire in Southern California’s history broke out on Friday, September 25, 1970…. One of the major fire areas was east of San Diego. On Monday, September 28, this fire moved west and south burning 185,000 acres and destroying about 250 homes. In addition, between 50,000–60,000 people were forced to evacuate the outskirts of San Diego….
On Sunday, September 27, evacuation orders were given to residents east of El Cajon, California and south of a 30-mile stretch of Highway 80—this area lies east of San Diego. Evacuees were requested to report to the San Diego County Civil Defense Headquarters for registration and assistance. Swamped with mobilizing and coordinating resources from local, state, and federal agencies, civil defense had neither the time nor personnel to handle evacuee registration adequately and thus turned to the local community for assistance. Volunteers responded to this request by developing an organized effort to handle evacuee registration and support activities for firefighters. This group was separate from civil defense, developing its own independent leadership and making its own decisions; hence, it is viewed as not an extension of civil defense operations but rather as an autonomous operating group.
Mrs. B., vice president of a local women’s club, heard from a friend of the need for volunteers to assist in registering evacuees. Accompanied by her husband, she arrived at civil defense headquarters (CDHQ) Sunday afternoon to find that several others present had already begun to set up tables and card files to help process incoming evacuees. Evacuees began to stream into the building late Sunday afternoon, filling corridors and creating a general state of confusion. At this point, Mr. B. jumped onto a table and asked the crowd to line up behind tables so that an orderly registration could proceed. From this point on, Mr. B. was consulted for directions and decisions.
As evacuation orders were issued over radio and television, individual citizens began telephoning CDHQ volunteering to take animals (primarily horses) and to provide shelter, food, and other supplies for fire victims. The contents of these calls were recorded on cards noting the donor’s name, address, telephone number, and nature of donation. It shortly became apparent that more telephones were needed, and four additional lines were immediately installed. In addition to these calls, food, clothing, medical supplies, blankets, and personal items (toothpaste, soap, shaving equipment) began arriving at CDHQ. A number of young men volunteered to unload these items from trucks and cars and to stock them in the designated storage area in the building. It was felt that all items should be inventoried, recording name, address, and telephone number of the donor.
By Sunday evening evacuees had stopped coming in and those present had a breathing spell. This time was further spent organizing activities and making specific task allocations. Mr. B. felt that he needed assistance and called upon a close friend, Mr. R., to see if he would volunteer his time. Mr. R., an insurance salesman with flexible working hours, agreed. He arrived and was briefed by Mr. B. regarding the operation and problems. The greatest problems at this time were answering and recording telephone calls and processing the continuous influx of resources. Working together, Mr. B and Mr. R. began assigning workers who seemed dependable and efficient to specific tasks, e.g., developing and organizing a supply room, an emergency medical area, a home referral system, and a system of food runs to transport sandwiches and coffee to firefighters. An agreement was reached that Mr. B. would become night coordinator while Mr. R. would supervise daytime activities.
On Monday, the demands placed on the group began to change. Instead of handling evacuation registration, firefighters began arriving for food and a place to rest. The whole internal structure was reorganized to meet this demand by acquiring cots and personal toiletries, maintaining a kitchen, and developing a system to launder firefighters’ clothing while they slept. A volunteer was assigned to gather and bag clothing and to work out a system to transport it to and from Laundromats where volunteers from local women’s clubs would wash them.
By Wednesday, the group organization began to take definite form. Departments were set up to take care of specific task areas. Five basic activities crystallized: general support and assistance; providing food and clean clothing for firefighters; stockroom to receive, record, and dispense all material resources; a food and coffee relay system, which operated between CDHQ and the firefighters; and lastly, a communications department which received, sent, and recorded all incoming and outgoing telephone calls. Mr. R. and Mr. B coordinated and integrated the activities of the various departments. Fifteen persons were present at all times to staff the operation.
One week from the day it began, the decision was made to close down the San Diego support operation. The fire had been contained, and residents had returned to their homes. Material resources, gathered throughout the emergency, were dispensed to other organizations and agencies who would continue to assist fire victims. 1
