ABSTRACT
The command and control (C2) of nuclear arsenals is a complex and daunting task. The academic literature on emerging nuclear powers remains divided on both the probable structure of C2 arrangements in these states and on the impact of C2 arrangements on regional stability. India and Pakistan have chosen decidedly different C2 approaches, reflecting their distinct security needs, military organization, and political structures. India's command and control system represents an assertive model with negative controls on use, while Pakistan has delegated primary authority and responsibility to the military. Kargil demonstrates that, despite over fifty years of conflict and interaction, the Pakistan military suffers from a terrible case of strategic myopia it perceives India, and only India, as the threat, but persistently misjudges Indian capabilities and resolve. The Pakistani military is not a "rogue elephant". Its officers and enlisted personnel have demonstrated great courage, patriotism, skill, and integrity.
