ABSTRACT
Introduction In order to give the general framework within which this paper must be considered, some points have to be clarified. Information concerning the number of armed forces is not readily available and not reliable, particularly as far as the Warsaw Pact is concerned. When one tries to deal with military budgets it is even more difficult. First one has to examine whether all defence expenditure is shown in the military budget, and this is not always the case. The Military Balance, 1973-4, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), stated that 'The Soviet defence budget, which has remained implausibly static at just under 18 billion roubles a year since 1969, excludes a number of items: "military R&D (Research and Developmen t): stockpiling, civil defence, foreign military aid, as well as space and nuclear energy programmes"; and also frontier guards and other security troops') The SIPRI Yearbook, 1973, published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), is not of the same opinion. It stated that 'The evidence showing that particular activities are financed outside the defence budget is not conclusive, and the upward adjustment made for these alleged omissions are highly speculative'.2
