ABSTRACT
When Kissinger said of his failure to consult with the allies during the Middle East crisis that some of those consulted with cooperated least, Jobert retorted: ~Who does he mean, the Russians?'l The United States, insisting that detente ('a relaxation of tensions
between nations') exists between itself and the Soviet Union, ignored the Soviet failure to give warning of coming conflict between third parties, played down the massive arms shipments to the Soviet clients and delayed its shipments to its own clients. And when the United States responded to the Soviet build-up in the Mediterranean, the troop massing, and the so-called 'brutal note' with an alert of forces, this move, despite having been effective, was subjected to serious question by friend and foe, domestic and foreign, as to its intention, wisdom, and efficacy. Indeed, when the Soviet clients began to lose, the United States moved quickly to end the fighting in the hope of preserving the superpower detente and a similar tense balance among the client principals. The status of forces which resulted gave little encouragement, then or subsequently, to those seeking the goal of peace, although 'shuttle diplomacy' has accomplished the unprecedented. Whether the Geneva negotiations will result in positions actually being modified is another question.
