ABSTRACT
Manipulation of electoral rules can be a potent tool for marginalizing anti-system parties. This chapter examines electoral rules in Spain, the United Kingdom and Germany and their effectiveness at marginalizing anti-system parties in order to examine the hypothesis that democracies ban anti-system parties if alternative forms of marginalization are not effective. Electoral systems are considered effective alternatives if they prevent anti-system parties from winning any seats, or if such parties win seats, when they are underrepresented in terms of their vote to seat share. The chapter analyses how electoral systems effect electoral fortunes of banned parties, banned parties that are legalized and those subject to failed ban attempts, namely Herri Batasuna and its successors, Sinn Féin and Republican Clubs, the Socialist Reich Party and National Democratic Party of Germany. For banned parties, analysis showed that democracies ban parties when electoral system were not effective. However, despite expectations, legalization also occurred when electoral system failed to provide an effective alternative to banning. For failed party bans electoral systems were effective at banning parties. These findings suggest the availability (or otherwise) of effective alternatives to party bans does not effect party ban decisions.
