ABSTRACT
This chapter examines John McDowell's interpretation of Wittgenstein's discussion of normative rules that govern, among other things. McDowell's central project is shedding light on the relation of Mind and World, and concentrating on rules. But McDowell thinks that what makes the relation of mind and world seem problematic is a deeper dualism between norms and nature. The deeper dualism is between the kind of intelligibility exemplified in what Sellars calls the "space of reasons", which is structured by normative rules, and what McDowell calls the "realm of law". McDowell's discussion of meaning and understanding follows Wittgenstein's central emphasis on the importance of rules. McDowell sets out his own interpretation of Wittgenstein's work by contrasting his account of Wittgenstein with Kripke's and Wright's accounts. McDowell raises a number of objections to the interpretations of Wittgenstein set out by Kripke and Wright. McDowell's rejection of Kripke's and Wright's master thesis turns in part on considering other cases of normative relatedness.
