ABSTRACT
This chapter describes the main themes of John McDowell's investigation of a Davidsonian 'truth theory' of meaning. It aims to articulate the structure of natural language by drawing on the logical machinery of Tarski's semantic conception of truth. Two major themes will emerge. One is McDowell's thinking that a theory of meaning cannot hope to explain meaning using meaning-free notions. The second theme is that of reflection on a Davidsonian theory providing a way of interpreting the Fregean distinction between sense and reference; and that distinction should play a role in people understanding of the relation of mind and world. Davidson's methodological claim for the philosophy of content is that one can clarify the nature of both linguistic meaning and mental content more generally by examining how it is determined in radical interpretation. The second reason for describing McDowell's interpretation of a Davidsonian truth theory of meaning as a modest theory derives from his argument with Dummett.
