ABSTRACT
This chapters proposes an alternative intentional semantics that connects thoughts as psychological episodes with the expression of the meanings of thoughts in sentences considered as existent spatiotemporal physical entities in a way that is neither Fregean Platonistic nor Quinean behaviouristic. The fact that the combinatorial analysis provides a definition of what it means for something to exist gives us an important advantage over most of the history of metaphysics in which the ontic status of abstract entities has been debated. Honing Ockham's razor to eliminate them from applied ontology, these critics have held that despite their usefulness abstract entities are not strictly needed for the kinds of explanations one's strictly need. The solution to Berkeley's objection must be similar to the distinctions drawn in order to rescue microphysical entities from the charge of predicational incompleteness extrapolated from dilemmas about the position-or-momentum indeterminacy of quantum phenomena.
