ABSTRACT
This chapter explores the combinatorial ontology, an expressly anti-Heideggerean anti-existentialist theory of being, that one should end up where Heidegger, relying on phenomenology rather than logic as the key to ontology, finds it necessary to begin. The applied ontology of cultural entities that one shall sketch for simplicity is limited to human culture. The ontology of language, art and artefacts that one's require must be fully general with respect to such possibilities, even if the theory is most conveniently illustrated with examples drawn exclusively from human culture, exemplifying what is most near and dear to us, that we are best able to study and comprehend. The healthy sceptical impulse that restrains metaphysical extravagance by invoking Ockham's razor might naturally want to raise doubts at the outset about the validity of introducing an ontology of culture. Cultural entities are not themselves minds, naturally, and if they embody or otherwise manifest thoughts they are not themselves mental occurrences.
