ABSTRACT
This chapter distinguishes hermeneutic fictionalism from revolutionary fictionalism. It also raises some worries for both forms of fictionalism. The chapter outlines and criticizes cognitive non-descriptivism. Hermeneutic is a mistake to think of fictionalism as one theory that can be split into hermeneutic and revolutionary views; it is better to think of hermeneutic and revolutionary fictionalism as distinct positions. Revolutionary fictionalism is a prescriptive theory that makes a claim about what our moral practice ought to be like. An obvious problem with hermeneutic fictionalism is that it claims that our current moral practice is a fiction. To understand revolutionary fictionalism better it is worth comparing it to hermeneutic fictionalism. In particular, it is worth considering their different descriptions of our current moral practice. The hermeneutic fictionalist suggests that, in a similar way, people are so familiar with using moral language as a fiction that there is no accompanying phenomenology. This then would be a response to the challenge from first-person authority.
