ABSTRACT
This chapter explains the attractions of combining non-naturalism and moral realism. It also outlines two non-naturalist realist positions. The chapter discusses the difficulties involved in demarcating naturalism from non-naturalism. The realism claims that the features that make moral claims true are not natural features but rather they are non-natural. If realism is correct then moral properties would have to be able to guide us, justify us and provide correctness conditions for future use. Realism is attractive because it captures some of fundamental commitments in morality such as convergence, truth, disagreement, moral progress and phenomenology. Realism holds that moral judgements can be true or false, that sometimes they are true and that what makes them true is independent from people's beliefs, judgements or desires. In his fascinating and well written book Moral Realism Shafer-Landau argues that non-natural moral realism is a perfectly coherent, defensible and attractive position. His work is part of a new and growing interest in non-naturalism.
