ABSTRACT
This chapter explains the Frege-Geach problem. It also explains quasi-realism and how it can respond to the Frege-Geach problem. The chapter discusses a number of problems for quasi-realism. It also describes some problems with trying to demarcate cognitivism from non-cognitivism. Quasi-realism starts from a non-cognitivist position and it may be easier to understand it if one first considers why non-cognitivism developed as it did. Non-cognitivism grew in popularity after the publication of Moore's Principia Ethica in 1903. Although non-cognitivists believe that the truth in Moore's work is that moral terms cannot be defined, they also think that Moore was wrong to reach for non-natural properties as an explanation for this. The Frege-Geach problem was first stated by Peter Geach when he challenged non-cognitivism by pointing out that the meaning of moral terms do not vary across asserted and unasserted contexts; and in moral language the non-cognitivist is committed to the meaning varying across asserted and unasserted contexts.
