chapter  10
15 Pages

Personal idealism: from Ward to McTaggart

Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison1 was the co-editor, with R. B. Haldane, of Essays in Philosophical Criticism (Seth & Haldane 1883), one of the foundational texts for Hegelian absolute idealism in British philosophy. Yet, four years later he would publish Hegelianism and Personality, an objection to absolutism on the grounds that it presents an insuffi cient treatment of the personal, thus giving birth to personal idealism. Pringle-Pattison claimed that the unifi cation of consciousness in a single self was the radical error of both Hegelianism and the allied English doctrine of absolute idealism: “I have a centre of my own – a will of my own – which no one shares with me or can share, a centre which I maintain even in my dealings with God himself ” (1887: 217).