ABSTRACT
This chapter examines some of onto-logical presuppositions, and considers how studies in these areas might be accommodated within a scientific realist metaphysical framework. The general theory of what exists most fundamentally is sometimes known as first philosophy. The ontology of scientific realism could plausibly be developed to have such a role. As a first philosophy, it would have important implications for most kinds of enquiries. Realists about time believe that time is essentially concerned with the rates of change occurring in various kinds of natural processes. Therefore, if, as a realist, one believes that there is such a thing as global time, one must also believe that there is a process of global evolution to which it refers. Realism in the philosophy of mathematics, wherever it has existed, has nearly always been strongly influenced by Platonism, and therefore by a philosophy that is antithetical to theories of properties and relations that are of Aristotelian origin.
