ABSTRACT
Jennifer Hornsby writes that the truth of might be thought to denote a state of affairs added to any to which someone who says that the "rose is red" is committed, or it might be thought simply to denote the same state of affairs as the roses being red does. Hornsby wonders whether nominalized phrases such as the roses not being blue, the roses being red or yellow and others are all equally good candidates for denoting truth-makers. She remembers that there are friends of states of affairs who doubt the existence of negative or disjunctive ones. Julian Dodd argues that the asymmetry of the dependence between truth and reality is a conceptual and not a modal-existential asymmetry. Taking inspiration from Russell's theory of judgement, Dodd claims that it may be correct to think of grounding as a relation, but it does not follow that it is a relation between a true proposition and a truth-maker.
