ABSTRACT
The account of the origin and development of Husserl's pure phenomenology so far has identified two important contexts for grasping as a task. First, his realization of the shortcomings of a more or less orthodox adherence to the principles of Brentanian descriptive psychology. Second, his realization that even a reformed descriptive psychology operated with a fundamental presupposition that prevented the proper methodical access to the ideal meanings of mathematics and pure logic generated the task of reformulating the descriptive moment of descriptive psychology as a pure phenomenology. The task-oriented character of "pure phenomenology" thus signals that it is not a finished philosophical system but a method of research and, above all, that a research agenda drives its methodology. Husserl's self-understanding of his so-called "Platonism", then, is that it is based in the simple reference to original givens that appear before pure phenomenology's methodically reflective regard.
