ABSTRACT
Since Descartes made skeptical doubt the modus operandi of his philosophical meditations, the authors are familiar with the idea that skepticism may have something going for it, despite its conceded impracticality. Skepticism, in the Cartesian tradition, is something to be considered only when we have rid our mind of all worries and arranged for ourselves a clear stretch of free time. Historically, however, self-described skeptics have not gone this route. They have defended the practical wisdom of skepticism. Skepticism is an epistemic virtue, therefore, if and only if is both "epistemic" and a virtue. "Cartesian skepticism" in contemporary epistemology is standard identified not with suspension of judgment but with the view that knowledge of the external world is impossible. "Skepticism about expertise" involves doubt about what experts say, but this doubt is typically coupled with a dogmatic acceptance of what some other source of information says.
