ABSTRACT

This introduction presents an overview of key concepts discussed in the subsequent chapters of this book. The book traces the history of the alternative positions and argues for one coherent understanding of an alternative to mainstream logical empiricism. The Logical Empiricists explores the idea that all of formerly a priori knowledge is analytic, but the position shows to be problematic and many consider it to have been refuted by Quine. Quine, who rejected truth by convention and the very distinction between analytic and synthetic statements, adopting a holism in which all of science is empirical. Quineans emphasize the empirical nature of all knowledge, while author emphasize the constitutive element at the foundation of scientific knowledge. Michael Friedman underlines the fact that both Carnap's and Quine's versions of scientism have failed, given that philosophy of science cannot be reduced to logic or to behaviorist psychology. Quine's viewpoint provides no framework for understanding conceptual change in science.