ABSTRACT

This chapter proposes neuro-psychoanalysis as reductionist and verificationist, and investigates why anti-reductionism and anti-verificationism? is preferred. Encasing metaphysics and metapsychology in an impregnable sovereign autonomy would be the surest way to ossify and kill them, and, in so doing, inflict untold collateral damage across a wide range of other disciplinary regions. The chapter provides earlier regarding the topics of transference and the id at the intersection of psychoanalysis and neurobiology. A non-reductive materialism qua materialism proper is unavoidably obligated to explain how the material nature of the natural sciences allows for the intra-natural emergence and subsequent endurance of structures and dynamics irreducible. This is precisely what transcendental materialism, with its immanent-critical, dialectical-speculative engagements with the life sciences, attempts to accomplish. The new basic tendency in the life sciences represented by the likes of Donald O. Hebb and Stephen Jay Gould rapidly gains momentum in the research related to evolutionary theory, epigenetics, neuroplasticity, mirror neurons, affective neuroscience and neuro-psychoanalysis.