ABSTRACT
Terence Cuneo* Department of Philosophy, University of Vermont, 70 S. Williams, Burlington VT 05401
(Received 18 October 2013; accepted 25 October 2013)
What role do the first principles of morals play in Reid’s moral theory? Reid has an official line regarding their role, which identifies these principles as foundational propositions that evidentially ground other moral propositions. I claim that, by Reid’s own lights, this line of thought is mistaken. There is, however, another line of thought in Reid, one which identifies the first principles of morals as constitutive of moral thought. I explore this interpretation, arguing that it is a fruitful way of understanding much of what Reid wants to say about the role of moral first principles and drawing some connections between it and recent work on moral nonnaturalism. Keywords: constitutivism; first principles; foundationalism; moral nonnaturalism; Derek Parfit
Toward the end of Essays on the Active Powers of Man, Reid offers a list of propositions that he calls the first principles of morals, dividing this list into two sections. The first section, Reid says, includes propositions that pertain to ‘virtue in general, or to the different particular branches of virtue, or to the comparison of virtues where they seem to interfere’ (EAP V.i: 271). They are:
1G. There are some things in human conduct, that merit approbation and praise, others that merit blame and punishment; and different degrees either of approbation or of blame, are due to different actions. 2G. What is in no degree voluntary can neither deserve moral approbation nor blame. 3G. What is done from unavoidable necessity may be agreeable or disagreeable, useful or hurtful, but cannot be the object either of blame or moral approbation. 4G. Men may be highly culpable in omitting what they ought to have done, as well as in doing what they ought not. 5G. We ought to use the best means we can to be well informed of our duty, by serious attention to moral instruction; by observing what we approve, and what we disapprove, in others and ourselves; by reflecting often on our own past conduct; and by deliberating coolly and impartially upon our future conduct.
